Housing Issues in Economic Stabilization Policy by Leo Grebler
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Housing Issues in Economic Stabilization Policy





Chapter Title: The Selective Credit Controls of 1955
Chapter Author: Leo Grebler
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2411
Chapter pages in book: (p. 37 - 68)3
TheSelective Credit Controls of 1955
In early 1955, maladjustments following in the wake of the rapid expan-
sion in home building became more and more evident. In January it was
reported that rental vacancies were increasing as tenants were drawn into
purchases of homes with little or no cash requirements. Indications of rising
vaèancies continued, and by spring there was substantial public discussion
of "overbuilding." 1Specialsurveys by local FHA and V.A. offices, which
were initiated at that time, showed actual or emerging surpluses of new
homes offered for sale in an increasing number of cities. As ,for rental hous-
ing, the average vacancy rate in FHA-financed projects at the end of March
1955 stood at 4.4 per cent as against 3.5 per cent the year before and 2.8
percent in 1953. More significantly, 38 of the 75 field offices reported
vacancy rates in excess of 5 per cent compared with only 24 the year before,
and 12 offices showed vacancies of i o per cent or more. Among the latter
were field districts which included large cities such as Providence, Indianap-
olis, Little Rock, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, Fort Worth, Houston, and
San Diego.2
Despite the inadequacy of data on the current state of the housing market
and the difficulty of interpreting widely varying local conditions, it became
obvious that the sale of the unusually large number of homes that had been
started in the latter part of 1954 and early 1955 was difficult in many
1House and Home, January 1955,p.39,andApril 1955,p.137.Cf.also the state-
ment by Marriner Eccies on March io,1955: "... thereare elements of real danger
to the economy from overbuilding of homes made possible by excessive easy mortgage
terms. .. ." StockMarket Study, Hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, 84th Congress, 1st Session, May 1955, p. 464.
supplied by the Federal Housing Administration. In some areas rental vacan-
cies were concentrated in FHA war and postwar housing projects built near military
or defense production installations and subject to changes in military programs. This
fact complicated the interpretation of the rise in vacancies.
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areas.Particularly in the West and the South where housing starts had
increased most, builders offered cash payments for moving expenses and
premiums of one kind or another in order to promote sales; one of the
inducements was the "no-no down-payment" Joan already referred to in
the preceding chapter. These marketing practices, together with increasing
vacancies, clearly indicated that the rate of housing starts in late 1954and
early 1955 to1.4millionunits) could not be sustained for long at
current prices for homes even on the very generous financing terms then
available to home builders and purchasers.
Further maladjustments appeared in the form of shortages of a variety
of building materials and of price rises. While the rate of housing starts
leveled off after December 1954, expenditures for new residential construc-
tion, which are the more pertinent measure of pressures on resources, kept
on increasing sharply throughout the first half of 1955. Already in January
supply difficulties were reported for gypsum, composition sheeting, and
plasterboard.3 Later, cement, copper and brass products, and structural steel
TABLE 12




AverageMonth 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
1946 69.1 Jan. .117.8 118.5 119.6 122.1 129.4 130.5
1947 94.0 Feb. 117.9 118.7 119.2 122.5 129.6 130.5
1948 104.0March 118.0 119.2 119.3 122.8 130.5 130.5
1949 102.0 April 118.2 119.9 119.0 123.4 130.7
1950 109.5May 118.1 120.2 118.6 124.1 130.8 130.7
1951 119.6June 117.8 120.5 118.5 124.1 130.6 130.7
1952 118.2July 118.0 121.3 120.5 125.7 130.6 131.4
1953 119.9Aug. 118.6 120.8 120.8 127.4 131.5 131.2
1954 120.2 Sept. 118.7 120.4 121.3 128.5 131.0 130.9
1955 125.5 Oct. 118.6 120.0 121.7 128.7 131.0 130.2
1956 130.6Nov. 118.4 119.5 121.9 128.1 130.8 130.1
1957 130.6 Dec. 118.3 119.6 122.0 128.3 130.5 130.1
U.S. Department of Labor.
joined the in short supply, and construction delays became more
frequent. Wholesale prices of building materials had begun to move up in
the second half of i andthey increased—2.g per cent between July 1954
andApril 1955 (Table 12)—at a faster rate than prices of industrial corn-
8House and Home, January 1955,p.39.
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moditiesas a whole. While construction costs rose only moderately (Table 7),
the price of land apparently rose more sharply.4 Thus, inflationary pressures
in residential construction were apparent before the general advance of
industrial prices in the summer of 1955.
Although the financial markets had become slightly firmer in the second
half of iand residential mortgage commitments had ceased to expand
late that year, mortgage recordings and the home mortgage debt increased
ChART 3
No-Down-Payment and Long-Maturity Loans as a
Percentage of All V.A.-Guaranteed Primary
Home Loans Closed, Monthly, 1953-1957
instance, the average market price of sites for new homes bought with FHA
loans increased from $1,456 to $1,626between1954andL955 and again to $1,887
in (ioth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956, Table
Ifl-38, p. 98). Cf. also the following data given by William C. Levitt. His firm
purchased a tract of land on Long Island in 1949 for $2,500peracre and sold it
in 1951for$4,500.Whenthe property changed hands again one and a half years
later, the sales price was $8,ooo. In a subsequent sale in 1954-1955,theprice paid
for the same land was $15,000.(MortgageMarket Problems, Hearings before a Sub-
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sharplyand much of this increase occurred in the government-underwritten
sector of the market, particularly under the veterans' home loan program.
Reflecting earlier commitment and financing arrangements, credit terms on
loans closed during the first few months of the year were progressively more
liberal, as is evident from the further increase in no-down-payment and
long-maturity loans to veterans (Chart 3 and Table 26).Aslenders were
unable to absorb the rapidly growing volume of mortgage loans and meet
the rising demand for other long-term funds, they resorted increasingly to
the use of short-term credit to help them fulfill the heavy commitments made
earlier. This condition was dramatized in January 1955whenthe press
reported that the Prudential Insurance Company had made a "mortgage
warehousing" agreement with a syndicate of i50 commercialbanks in the
amount of $350million.5This was the first time an insurance company had
been known to enter into a mortgage warehousing arrangement directly.
It was also the largest single mortgage warehousing transaction ever reported,
and the terms of• 12toi8 months were longer than usual.
These developments in the housing and mortgage markets coincided with
the accelerated pace of general economic recovery. By late i therecovery
had made up but half the previous decline in industrial output. Outlays on
plant and equipment and federal spending were still moving downward. The
liquidation of inventories had just come to a halt. In the spring of 1955,
however,expenditures for plant and equipment began to increase, and the
decline in federal spending ceased. Private nonresidential construction was
expanding, although less than the residential sector. Largely reflecting the
booming automobile market, consumer purchases rose more rapidly. Stock
prices continued to climb, and both commercial bank loans and consumer
credit increased sharply. Thus, there was a swift convergence of expansion-
ary forces:
The Federal Reserve authorities responded to the evolving business expan-
sion with caution. The policy of "active credit ease" was changed to one of
"ease" in December 1954.InJanuary, the directive for open-market opera-
tions modified this policy further without, however, calling for a program of
restraint, and stock margin requirements were raised. In April, discount
rates were increased moderately from 1.5toipercent, and stock margin
requirements were raised again. In May, the objective to "encourage recov-
cry" was deleted from the directive for open-market operations. Throughout
the second quarter of the year, these operations had little net effect on bank
For a detailed description of this transaction, seeInvestigationof Housing, 1955,
Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Banking and Currency
Committee, 84th Congress, ist Session, October 1955 (Part I, pp. 129ff.).Mortgage
warehousing credit will be defined later when restraints on this type of credit are
discussed.
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reserves.A clear policy of restraint was not initiated before early August.6
It was under these conditions that selective controls on housing credit were
considered and put into effect.
Catalogue of Restraints
The first restraining action was taken on April 28 when both the Veterans
Administration and the Federal Housing Administration issued regulations
requiring that "closing costs," which cover legal fees and other charges
associated with real-estate and mortgage transactions, be paid in cash by
the borrower.T The tendency for builders to absorb these costs or for lenders
to cover them in the amount of the mortgage loan, though not widespread,
had been growing rapidly in 1954 and early 1.955 as a result of intense
competition among both mortgage lenders and builders. In the case of no-
down-payment loans to veterans where this arrangement was most frequent,
it enabled home builders to offer "no-no down-payment" loans, that is, the
buyer was relieved of any cash outlay for the transaction. The new regula-
tion probably resulted in a minimum cash outlay of about $200 to $250 in
the case of homes in moderate price ranges, equal to about 2 per cent of
the purchase price of the property.
At about the same time another, more significant action was taken. The
field offices of the FHA and V.A. "were instructed to intensify their surveys
of local housing markets, and to take coordinated steps to restrain Federal
underwriting of mortgages in localities where housing surpluses were found
to exist." 8Ithad been standing practice of the Federal Housing Administra-
tion, virtually since the beginning of its operations, to curb the issuance of
insurance commitments for "speculative" residential projects when local
housing market analysis indicated actual or potential oversupply of new
dwellings in an area. A similar approach was later adopted in the loan
guaranty activities of the Veterans Administration. The restraints may be
exercised for the entire locality or only for certain parts of it, and for hous-
ing of all types and price classes or only for specific submarkets, depending
on local conditions. The rationing may range from complete suspension of
new commitments to moderate reductions in the number of dwelling units
on builders' applications. Its duration varies with the time required for the
excess supply to be absorbed. To avoid any difficulties resulting from pub-
Forty-first Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 1954,andForty-second Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1955.
'VeteransAdministration, Department of Veterans Benefits regulation 36:4312.
For FHA: 9th Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 5955,p.45.
°EconomicReport of the President, January 1956, p. 38.
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licity,the localities in which such actions were taken have never been
identified, nor has this method of restraint ever been described. Individual
cases, however, have become known in the trade and have sometimes been
reported in trade journals.
Against this background, the meaning of the action becomes clearer. In
addition to more intensive survey work to keep the agencies abreast of local
market developments, the measure apparently for the first time sought to
assure coordination of FHA and V.A. policies at the local level. At about
this time, both FHA and V.A. were reported to have reduced the issuance
of commitments in a fairly large number of areas.9
In July, several additional actions were taken. On July 30, about coinci-
dent with the adoption by the Federal Reserve of a policy of general credit
restraint, the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administra-
tion issued regulations requiring an increase in minimum down payments on
homes bought with FHA or V.A. loans and reducing the maximum maturity
of such loans from 30 to 25 years.1° In the case of V.A. loans, the new
minimum down payment was 2 per cent of the purchase price of the prop-
erty compared to zero before the regulation. In the case of FHA loans, the
required down payment was increased from 5 to 7 per cent on the first
$g,ooo of value and from 25to27percent on amounts exceeding $9,000.
For example, the minimum down payment on a $15,000 house bought with
an FHA loan was $2,300(rounded)instead of $2,000.
In the months immediately preceding these actions, veterans' home loans
without down payment had increased to about 45 of all home loans
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration—the highest percentage ever
recorded except for 1950. For loans on new or proposed construction, the
share of no-down-payment transactions in the total had risen to 58 per cent.
Loans with maturities from 26 to 30yearsshowed about the same sharp
upward movement. In fact, most of the great expansion in V.A.-guaranteed
lending during this period was in the form of no-down-payment and long-
maturity loans (Table 26).Asimilar though less pronounced liberalization
of terms occurred in FHA lending for which only annual statistics are avail-
able. Two-thirds of all FHA loans on new homes in 1955werefor 86-95 per
cent of value, as against less than half in 1954; and 43 per cent of all loans
on existing homes were in this class, compared to only 17 per cent in 1954.
and Home reported in its June 1955issue(p. 136) that local V.A. offices
were "rationing" the issuance of "certificates of reasonable value" to builders. In
its July issue (p. 137),Houseand Home quoted the Commissioner of the Federal
Housing Administration to the effect that the FHA, because of housing surpluses, was
"holding up" commitments to builders in several areas.
VeteransAdministration Information Service, press release dated july 30,1955.
Federal Housing Administration, press release No. 55-57, dated July 3!,
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Averagematurities increased from 22.9 to 25.6yearsfor loans on new homes,
and from 20.1 to 22.7 years for loans on existing homes.'1
Other restraining actions taken in July directly affected the volume of
funds available for mortgage lending rather than the credit terms available
to home purchasers. The Federal National Mortgage Association reduced
the prices at which it offered to sell FHA and V.A. home mortgages held
in its "management and liquidation" portfolio, so as to activate sales and
sop up funds. As the mortgage market tightened and prices of loans in the
secondary market fell, sales failed to respond, however, and the sales program
was suspended in October.'2 The Association during iwas a net supplier
of funds.
More significant than FNMA's abortive effort to raise the volume of its
mortgage sales were warnings by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board against excessive use of interim
credit by mortgage lenders. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York cau-
tioned commercial banks in its district against "possible abuses in the use
of bank credit" in mortgage warehousing transactions.'3 The Chairman of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, on July i8, urged the presidents of the
Home Loan Banks to consider their lending program and stressed, among
other things, that it would be desirable for member savings and loan associa-
tions "to curb their forward commitments." 14Sincesavings and loan asso-
ciations mainly make uninsured mortgage loans, this warning, as well as
subsequent actions of the Bank Board, chiefly affected the conventional
mortgage market.
While the lending operations of the Federal Home Loan Banks were de-
scribed in the outline of federal housing credit programs (Chapter i),
mortgage warehousing arrangements require brief explanation at this point.
Mortgage warehousing has been defined as "the granting of interim loans by
commercial banks to nonbank real estate lenders." Its main purpose is to
bridge the interval between the time a mortgage is originated and the time
itis delivered to a permanent investor. During this interval, mortgage
papers must be completed and usually a "package" of loans must be as-
zothAnnual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956,Tables111-38
and 111-43. The data reflect partly the liberalization of maximum FHA terms in the
Housing Act of 1954.
9th Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1955,p.362 and
Table 14.
13 Seethe letter by the President of the Bank to Congressman Rains in Investiga-
tions of Housing, 1955,p.119.Commercialbanks in the Second Federal Reserve Dis-
trict held about one-fourth of the total volume of warehousing ]oans outstanding in
August 1955. Cf. Jack Guttentag, "Mortgage Warehousing," The Journal of Finance,
December 1957,p.438, note 2.
14 SeeMortgage Market Problems, p. 51.
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sembledfor delivery to a portfolio lender. Mortgage warehousing is most
common in connection with FHA or V.A. loans on new construction, and it
is most frequently used by mortgage companies which rely heavily on bank
credit for the assembly and temporary inventorying of mortgages before
sale or assignment to a permanent investor. Thus, mortgage warehousing
arrangements have become an important means of smoothing the home-
financing process; and builders under the FHA and V.A. programs have
become quite dependent on an adequate supply of this type of credit, as
well as on short term construction financing and long-term mortgage loans
to home purchasers—the first and the final phases of the complex chain of
financing transactions associated with home building. The dependence on
mortgage warehousing has probably increased during the postwar period,
reflecting the larger scale of builders' operations and the resulting longer
production period for individual projects, the greater importance of mort-
gage companies as originators of government-underwritten loans, and the
growing tendency of mortgage lenders to make forward commitments which
lengthen the period elapsing between their decisions to invest and the final
disbursement of funds. Mortgage warehousing may also be used when mort-
gage originators are unable to place loans with portfolio lenders on terms
acceptable to them and expect better terms at a later Or the demand
for warehousing may come from permanent mortgage investors who, because
of temporary overcommitment, wish to delay acceptance of mortgages ready
for delivery. Finally, warehousing loans may be obtained by lenders when
they find it advantageous to expand their mortgage investment program
beyond the cash funds immediately available for this purpose. There are
several types of such arrangements, and their legal forms vary a great
In September, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board supplemented its
earlier warning against excessive borrowing by members of the bank system
with a program of formal restraints. Members were advised that they should
adjust their lending to available cash flows; Home Loan Bank advances
for the purchase of mortgage loans and government securities were pro-
hibited; and a "reasonable reduction" was to be required before renewal of
outstanding advances.16 These restraints were somewhat relaxed in October
to enable member associations to make good on the large volume of loan
commitments they had undertaken before the rationing program of Septem-
ber was announced, and to counteract a widespread impression that the
For detail, see Jack Guttentag, op. cit.; Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential
Mortgage Market, Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, in press; and
idem, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Occasional Paper 6o,
Market Problems, pp. 52-53(ExhibitB); also, pp. 44-5 1.
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doorsof the Federal Home Loan Banks had been shut except for borrow-
ings to meet emergencies.17
The following pages cover, first, the actions restraining credit extended
to home purchasers under the FHA and V.A. programs and, second, the
measures dealing with the use of interim credit by mortgage lenders them-
selves.
The Controls on Government-Underwritten Loans
The time sequence of restraining governmental actions and of movements
in the mortgage and housing markets during the first half of 1955suggests
clearly that the halt in the expansion of residential building cannot be
attributed to the selective housing credit regulations nor, for that matter,
to the shift in Federal Reserve policy. By April, when the first controls on
FHA and V.A. loans were initiated and general credit policy was changing
cautiously in the direction of restraint, housing starts had been leveling off
for about 3 months although they remained high; and expenditures for
residential construction were bound to reflect this movement after the usual
lapse of time. The end of the housing boom was rather associated, first, with
a rate of output that was unsustainable at current house prices and consumer
incomes, even on the very generous credit terms available to home pur-
chasers through mid-1955,18 and, second, with the reaction of financial
markets to an increasing over-all demand for funds relative to supply during
the second half of 1954.
By the same token, the fact that housing starts leveled off and the
financial markets became firmer in late 1954andearly 1955 clearly indicated
that market forces were already beginning to operate toward restraining the
housing boom by the time the permissible terms of government-underwritten
mortgage loans were tightened. Under these circumstances, the timing and
rationale of the selective restraints on FHA and V.A. loans require more
extensive discussion.
Timing and Rationale. It seems that the timing of restraints on govern-
ment-underwritten housing loans in 1955wasconditioned by four main
factors. One of these is the long production and marketing period in the
building and sale of homes, which delayed the detection of serious market
maladjustments. The second was reluctance to interfere with activity in a
sector endowed with special public interest. Third, so long as the strength
and depth of the general business recovery of 1953-1954wasuncertain, it
was difficult, if not impractical, to adopt a policy that would have slowed
down an important expansionary force. Fourth, the more powerful types of
11lbid., pp. 53-54 (Exhibit C).
18Thisstatement is couched in terms of house prices rather than rents since more
than 90percent of the new dwelling units started in 1954-1955werein one- and
two-family structures which are commonly offered for sale to owner occupants.
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controlson housing credit were imposed only when a definite policy of
general credit restraint was initiated. As policy-makers struggled with these
matters throughout the first half of 1955, the "policy gestation period"
was prolonged.
Among the many considerations controlling the imposition of selective
credit restraints in times of peace, a necessary condition would seem to be
evidence of impending, if not actual, serious maladjustments in the affected
sector of the economy. Only a clearly unsustainable expansion would war-
rant such drastic action. As was indicated earlier, imbalances generated
during the housing boom of 1954 became evident in the early months of
1955.Tobe sure, economic intelligence on current conditions in local hous-
ing markets was imperfect and, more important, forward indicators of market
activity were poorly developed; it was only in the spring of 1955thatsurvey
and other information of the FHA and V.A. field offices was utilized in such
manner as to provide continuing guides to action for government agencies
concerned with the development and coordination of stabilization policies.
But the Economic Report of the President of January 1955includedthe
pointed statement that "history... warnsus that activities which involve
the discontinuing of a long future, as in the case of home purchases arid the
pricing of corporate shares, may be carried to excess in the course of
a business expansion." 19 Also, the Open Market Committee of the Federal
Reserve noted on March 2that"there were some fears that in a few
industries, including building, activity was reaching levels that could not
be 20 Thus, therewas an awareness of impending, if not already
existing, maladjustments in the housing market.
That convincing evidence of such imbalances should not be notable earlier
is worth comment, for it has a bearing on the timing and the effects
of selective housing credit policies. The planning, building, and marketing
of homes by operative builders require considerable time. Once a house-
building project is started, the construction period is usually only about four
months, but if the prior steps in planning a site and obtaining financial
commitments are considered, an additional two to three months may be
involved, and the marketing of completed homes usually takes another two
months except for sales made from model homes or during the construction
period.21 Thus, whether demand has come up to expectations cannot corn-
Economic Report of the President, January 1955, p. 25.
Forty-SecondAnnual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1955,p.9!.
22Cf. Marvin Wilkerson and Dorothy K. Newman, "FHA and VA Housing Sta-
tistics and the Housing Market," Construction Review, June 1957, p. 4. In the case
of operations under the FHA and V.A. programs, "applications. .. usuallyprecede
actual start of construction ... byabout•to 4 months, and loan closings by about
5 to 7 months."
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monlybe determined until about six months after projects of operative
builders are started or perhaps eight months after FHA or V.A. have issued
commitments for government-underwritten financing. During the period
under consideration, firmcommitmentsby FHA on new construction and
the V.A.'s valuation in its "Certificate of Reasonable Value" were valid for
eight months but could be extended under special circumstances.
Applying these approximate time periods to the expansion of home build-
ing during i it seems probable that the increased number of dwelling
units started during the first half of 1954, when the rate of starts rose from
a little over one million units to about imillion,could be marketed with-
out difficulty upon completion. Sale of the rapidly mounting volume of units
placed under construction in the second half of the year, when the rate of
starts increased further to over imillionunits, apparently proved to be
more difficult, to judge from reports of rising inventories of unsold new
houses. These homes, however, were not completed and marketable before
late 1954andearly 1955, except for sales during construction. The crucial
test of the strength of demand came only about a year after the expansion
of residential building had begun. The relatively long period of planning,
construction, and sale thus delayed the appearance of clear evidence of
market maladjustments and, by the same token, militated against early
restraining action through selective controls. This is an inherent difficulty
in using the governmental credit programs for moderating short-term
fluctuations in the housing sector, although improvements in economic
intelligence initiated in 1955shouldhelp meet it in the future.
Little more need be said about the second factor conditioning the timing
of the restraints, i.e. the preferred status of housing among national objec-
tives. Reluctance to interfere in this sector reflected perhaps not only the pri-
ority status of housing, but also the fact that "... thegovernment is not yet
prepared to act as decisively to check inflation as it is to check recession."
Uncertainties about the economic outlook were not fully removed before
the first few months of i Thus,even if serious maladjustments in the
housing sector had become evident at an earlier point, it is questionable
whether selective credit restraints would have been initiated as long as there
was slack in the economy generally. While it was clear in late that a
substantial recovery was under way, it remained uncertain whether the
impetus would be sufficient to lift business activity to full-employment levels.
Increased investment in plant and equipment was in the offing, but the
initial expansion in this type of expenditure was quite moderate although
it was destined to become a dominant force in the general economic advance.
Under these circumstances, an administration intent on fostering full recov-
ery from a contraction would find it difficult to impose restraints on an
F. Burns, Prosperity Without Inflation, Fordham, 1957,p.41.
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importantsector of the economy and thus endanger the success of its policies
to support economic growth.
If this observation is correct, one of the alleged virtues of selective credit
regulations must be viewed with a degree of skepticism. It has sometimes
been claimed as an advantage of selective controls that they can be used
when a particular sector of the economy experiences the strains of unsus-
tainable expansion while the economy generally is sluggish—a condition
which makes it impossible or inadvisable to apply general credit restraints.
If the experience of 1955isany guide, this advantage of selective credit
measures may be less real than appears. To be sure, stock margin require-
ments—another selective control—were raised in January 1955andagain
in April before the policy of general credit restraint was adopted. But stock
market credit is probably in a class by itself in the community's judgment
so that its restraint may be more easily tolerated than restrictions on the types
of credit that in the public mind are directly associated with production and
employment.
The coincident timing of larger down-payment and shorter maturity
requirements for government-underwritten loans and of the general Federal
Reserve restraints in late July and early August 1955highlightsa related
problem in the use of selective credit controls. Is the imposition of selective
credit restraints feasible without a general monetary policy of restraint? The
case at hand would seem to support the view that selective credit regulations
"can serve most effectively.. .assupplements to controls of the over-all
type," 28ratherthan as independent measures solely for the suppression of
inflationary pressures in a specific sector of the economy. One of the two
selective controls on government-underwritten loans imposed before late
July i955—the requirement that loan closing costs be paid in cash by the
borrower—was of minor importance and significant mainly as a warning
signal. The other—the restraint on the issuance of commitments by FHA
and V.A. field offices—represented a customary action geared to local
market conditions. In contrast, the simultaneous measures of July and early
August—nation-wide adjustment of the permissible credit terms for govern-
ment-underwritten home loans, the adoption of a policy of general restraint
by the Federal Reserve authorities, and the warnings of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and the Home Loan Bank Board against excessive use of
interim credit by mortgage lenders—suggest a concerted effort even without
assuming a "grand design." In practice, each of these steps may have been
dependent upon the others. To what extent the various measures actually
were additive and mutually reinforcing remains to be examined when the
23R.J. Saulnier, "An Appraisal of Selective Credit Controls," American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting, May 1952,
p.262.
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over-all effects of the selective regulations of housing credit are reviewed.
Our observations on timing offer also some insight into the rationale of
the selective restrictions imposed during i 955. Basically, selective restraints
may be initiated either because output in a particular sector is believed to be
expanding at a clearly unsustainable rate or because its expansion, though
considered sustainable, is held to absorb too large a share of total resources
and thereby add to the inflationary pressures associated with a high level of
aggregate demand, or both. It seems that both considerations were judged
to be applicable in this case. If so, the question arises of the ways in which
selective credit regulations can supplement a policy of general credit restraint.
Selective credit measures may supplement general restraints if certain types
of credit, for institutional or other reasons, are relatively unresponsive to
over-all monetary actions.24 This is generally not the case for mortgage loans;
on the contrary, as will be shown in the next chapter, an over-all tightening
of credit in time tends to bear heavily on the housing sector. Selective credit
regulation may also supplement and reinforce general credit policy if it helps
establish stricter lending standards more promptly and thereby accelerates
the response to general monetary restraint. This result of selective regulation
was probably operative in the case at hand. Even in a tightening capital
market some lenders continued to make government-underwritten mortgage
loans on liberal terms in order to obtain a larger yield through increased
discounts from par, and their actions, through the forces of competition,
affected the entire market. The maximum terms permitted for government-
underwritten loans under these circumstances served as "yardsticks." More
restrictive maxima apparently curbed the tendency toward generous credit
terms more promptly, helped reduce the widening discounts in the secondary
mortgage market which resulted from this tendency, and moderated the
unsettling influence of high discounts on the market.
The "yardstick" effect of governmental maximum terms can be clearly
observed in the operation of the G.I. loan program after July 1955. The
reduction of the maximum maturity then imposed was rescinded in January
I 956. In contrast, the simultaneous requirement of a minimum down pay-
ment of 2 per cent was retained until April 1958.Throughout1956 and in
a large part of 1957, the mortgage market was tight, more so, in fact, than
in mid-i955. Under these circumstances, one would expect the restoration
of the maximum maturity of 30 years to have slight if any effects; loans made
at maximum maturities would show about the same downward movement
as the loans made without down payment, i.e. reflect the attrition of mort-
gages for which guaranty commitments or applications had been made before
24This has often been claimed for consumer instalment credit. For a summary of
opposing views on the subject, see Consumer Instalment Credit, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1957,PartI, Vol. i,pp.365-366 and pp. 380-382.
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July30,1955 andwhich therefore were exempt from the regulation. The
facts revealed in Chart 3, however, are quite different. No-down-payment
loans, which accounted for more than 40percent of all home loans in the
spring of I955,showed a declining share in the total during the rest of the
year and then dropped steadily to about 3 per cent at the end of 1957 as
the backlog of pre-regulation applications was worked off. Loans with 26-30
years maturity, which also accounted for more than 40percent of all loans
through most of 1955,beganto decline relative to the total in December and
continued downward to nearly 36 per cent in June 1956. Thereafter, how-
ever, their share in the total increased rather steadily and reached over 50
percent, or more than at the 1955peakof liberal lending, in September
1957,25beforethe easing of the money market in the fall of that year. Thus,
the restoration of the 30-year maximum maturity had an appreciable effect
even under adverse conditions in the financial markets. By the same token,
the restrictions of July 1955onthe permissible terms on FHA and V.A. loans
tended to reduce the lenders' opportunity to acquire mortgages on marginal
terms at the largest possible discount from par. To this extent, the selective
restraints performed a purpose not necessarily nor so speedily met by general
credit restraints and therefore reinforced the latter.
Another possible reason for supplementing general credit measures with
specific restraints on a sector which thrives on government-supported credit
stems from considerations of fiscal policy. Would it not be illogical as well
as unseemly for the federal government to sanction no-down-payment and
long-maturity housing loans while espousing general fiscal and monetary
restraints, as it did in the spring and summer of 1955?26 Whydeny funds
to credit-worthy businesses or curb meritorious federal spending programs
when borrowing on government-underwritten mortgages is to be unchecked?
Would the government not be guilty of irresponsible conduct of its fiscal
affairs if it failed to take restraining action in an important economic sector
The same tendency can be traced for V.A. loans at the maturity limit of 30years.
Mortgage loans with a maturity of 30yearswere 30.6 per cent of all loans guaranteed
by the V.A. in 1955,29.5 percent in 1956, and 33.9 per cent in 1957.(Datasupplied
by the Loan Guaranty Service of the Veterans Administration.) The number of long-
maturity loans, of course, declined as did the total volume of V.A. loans during these
years, but the point is that they declined less than the total. A differential movement
of long-maturity and low-down-payment loans, though a much smaller one, is also
observed in the annual data for FHA home loans. (Cf. ioth Annual Report, Housing
and Home Finance Agency, 1956,pp.ioi and 105.)Itis possible that lenders are
generally somewhat less concerned over long maturities than over low- or no-down-
payment loans.
This view is expressed, for example, in the following statement in a study of the
United States Savings and Loan League: "It is unwise and unfair to restrain institu-
tions making 70percent and 8o per cent loans while the government continues to
promote, purchase and guarantee go per cent, 95 per cent and i00 percent FHA
and VA loans." (Report of the Special Committee to Study the Federal Home Loan
Bank System, United States Savings and Loan League, 1956, p. 49.)
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on which it had substantial influence? Regardless of whether such considera-
tions were among those which prompted the initiation of selective controls
of housing credit in 1955,theyemphasize the fact that the growth of federal
credit programs has created new problems of equity in economic stabilization
policy—problems which will engage our attention at several later points.
Some Effects of the Restraints. Since, they can never be segregated from
other forces influencing the course of economic events, the effects of credit
policies defy satisfactory measurement. In the case at hand, selective credit
controls, general restraints by the monetary authorities, and plain market
forces were all acting simultaneously to reduce the supply of funds for mort-
gages relative to demand and cut down the volume of residential construc-
tion. Time lags accentuate the difficulty in establishing anything resembling
a causal relationship. The effects of relaxation or withdrawal of some of the
selective restraints in 1956andof offering positive relief to housing blended
inseparably with the effects of the restraints initiated the year before and of
the continued restrictive credit policies of the monetary authorities. Addi-
tional problems of measurement or even attribution will become readily
apparent in the following pages. Yet, we cannot hope to learn from experi-
ence unless we make an effort to appraise the operation of selective credit
regulations as best we can.27
Several circumstances combined to delay and weaken the effects of the
restraints on government-underwritten mortgages. First, as was pointed out
before, the controls were initiated when expansion in the housing sector
was already terminated. Second, time lags precluded immediate or even
early results. Third, the restrictions were moderate. Fourth, the shorter loan
maturity requirement was rescinded in January 1956, just 6 months after it
was put into effect, and only the additional down-payment requirement was
maintained—until March 1957 for FHA loans and April 1958 for V.A.
loans. The second and third items warrant further elaboration.
A large backlog of commitments issued and of applications received by
FHA and V.A. before the restraints became effective was exempt from the
regulation. The size of the backlog was not augmented by "leaks," nor was
there general anticipation of controls as in the case of Regulation X, which
was authorized by the Defense Production Act of August 1950butplaced
in effect in several stages between October of that year and February i951
Cf. Saulnier, op. cit.
Theadvance notice given to the trade in 1950,whichled to large numbers of
building projects being started in time to fall under the exemptions from the regula-
tion, was caused by the need for drawing up a new, complex regulation controlling
conventional mortgage loans, and also by the consultation with industry advisory
groups that was required by the Defense Production Act. No such inhibitions applied
to the regulations of July 30,1955. Fordetails on the lags of 1950,seeSaulnier,
op. cit., and James J. O'Leary, "The Effects of Monetary Policies on the Mortgage
Market," The Journal of Finance, May 1958.
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Thebacklog was largebecause the volume of FHA and V.A. activity in the
months preceding the regulation was extremely high and had increased so
much that personnel shortage, particularly in the Veterans Administration,
had slowed the processing of applications. While direct data on the backlog
are not available, the flow of applications and commitments suggests that,
in early August 1955,applicationsin process and commitments outstanding
for houses not yet started covered about 250,000 new dwelling units.
number was about 4 times the 63,000 dwelling units started under the gov-
ernment programs in July, i.e. it was sufficient to maintain the high current
rate of FHA- and V.A.-sponsored starts for 4 months. Another 250,000 units
started earlier under the programs were probably under construction at that
time. In view of the large backlog and the long time elapsing between new
applications and housing starts, the first effects of the restraints of July 30
on the volume of starts could not be felt before the end of the year. This
delay is illustrated in the slow decline after July 1955inthe share of no-
down-payment and long-maturity loans in the total number of veterans'
home loans closed on new homes (Table 26). In the case of loans on exist-
ing homes, however, the decline was much more rapid, reflecting a shorter
transaction time in the absence of the construction and planning period.
Thus, the restrictions were transmitted more readily to the market for
existing homes than to the financing of new houses.
It may be noted parenthetically that the treatment of applications and
commitments in the "pipeline" and, to that extent, the effectiveness of
selective credit measures are not symmetrical in the cases of restraint and
relaxation. In the former case, the exemption of backlogs, dictated by con-
siderations of practicality as well as equity, blunts the impact of restrictions.
In the latter, commitments already issued and applications pending may be
recast to conform to the new, more liberal terms if borrowers and lenders
agree to do so, on the grounds that it would be inequitable to discriminate
against the earlier applicants (who, in any case, could withdraw their old
applications and file new ones). Other things being equal, the effects of
changes in maximum terms are therefore more delayed and weaker when
terms are tightened than when they are liberalized.
in any event, the time lags in the processing of applications by federal
agencies and, more basically, the long periods intervening between forward
commitments by financial institutions and actual construction are bound
to soften the effects of selective housing credit restraints, as well as those of
general monetary restraints, and they pose difficult problems in the timing
of such actions.29
As for the severity of the new terms, the combined effects of the increased
Cf. O'Leary, op. cit., and Mortimer Kaplan, "Recent Institutional Arrangements
in Mortgage Lending," The Journal of Finance, May 1958.
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down-paymentrequirement and the shorter maximum loan maturity were
probably greater than critics who considered the restraints too weak sug-
gested and smaller than many builders who were on the firing line asserted.
The arithmetic of the change in maximum terms obviously does not tell the
whole story. Some of the home buyers who had availed themselves of the
lowest permissible down payment and the longest maturity under the law
could have afforded purchase at more restrictive terms. Or, just as the easy
terms permitted before the regulations of July 30, 1955 enabled buyers to
command a larger amount of debt and a more expensive home, the restric-
tions may have had the effect, in part, of causing purchasers in a given
income class and cash position to acquire more modest homes, rather than
of eliminating them from the With these reservations, the arith-
metic results of the new terms can at least be illustrated.
The effects of the additional down-payment requirement are illuminated
by sample data for home purchasers with V.A.-guaranteed loans in 1954 and
1955 (Table iVeteransbuying new homes with no-down-payment loans
in 1954 reported liquid assets averaging $920, or 8.6 per cent of the average
purchase price of their property. Veterans who made down payments had
liquid assets averaging $2,560 before purchase, or 20.3 per cent of the aver-
age purchase price. Nearly one-third of those buying without down payment
had liquid assets of less than $300, and more than 6o per cent reported less
than $6oo. The minimum down payment of 2percent required under the
regulation of July, in conjunction with cash outlays for closing costs and
other expenses involved in home purchase, would clearly have eliminated
most purchasers in the group with less than $300 ifl liquid assets and prob-
ably some of the veterans with $300 to $6oo. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that only 7.! per cent of those buying a new home with down
payment had liquid assets of less than and about i 8 per cent reported
less than $6oo. The relationships are quite similar for purchasers of existing
homes. Assuming that the 2 per cent down-payment requirement would have
eliminated one-third of the no-down-payment purchasers, about 85,000 pur-
chasers, or 13 per cent of all home buyers under the G.I. loan program,
would have been excluded in 1955 (derived from Table 26). Thus, in spite
of the innocuous appearance of a 2percent down payment, the effects were
not negligible. No comparable data are available for buyers under the FHA
program.
the effects of changing mortgage terms on consumers' ability to buy homes,
cf. Mortgage Market Problems, pp. 79-80 and 155-156. For systematic treatment of
the subject, see Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and
Financing, National Bureau of Economic Research, 195!,p.73ff.;. and Ranisay
Wood, "Credit Terms and Demand for Residential Construction," Study of Mortgage
Credit, Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The Selective Credit Controls of 1955
Thereduction of the maximum maturity of FHA and V.A. loans from 30
to 25 years raised the monthly debt charge from $5.07 per $i,ooo of loan
at 4.5 per cent interest to $5.56. On a $io,ooo loan, which is close to the
average amount of FHA loans in 1955 bu.t somewhat less than that of V.A.
loans, the difference would be abouta year. This seemingly small differ-
ence, however, is multiplied when translated into the income necessary to
support the increased debt service under the income-qualification standards
employed by the FHA and V.A. There is no generally applicable formula
for the transformation, but it is reasonable to take a cue from the relation
between average debt service and average income of new home purchasers
under the FHA program in 1955. On this yardstick, the borrower's required
income would average six and a half times the amount of debt service. Thus,
if the latter increased by $59 a year, the required income would be raised by
$373, a sufficient difference to disqualify an appreciable number of pur-
chasers at the margin.8' The effect of the reduced maximum maturity can
also be illustrated by the amount of loan which a given monthly debt service
will support. A debt service of $50 a month, for example, will carry a loan
of $9,862at4.5 per cent interest if the maturity is 30 years, but of only
$8,993, or nearly g per cent less, if the maturity isyears. The effect of
shortening the maturity would be equivalent to increasing the required down
payment by $869 in this case, other things being equal.
In summary, the "bite" of the reduced maximum maturities combined
with a moderate increase in minimum down payments was not negligible
although it was weakened by the late initiation of the restrictions, the large
backlog of exempt transactions, and the restoration of the 30-year maximum
maturity as early as January 1956. Nor can the effectiveness of the restraints
be dismissed on the grounds that many mortgage lenders applied even
stricter down-payment and loan maturity standards than those prescribed
by the regulations. As was shown earlier, the maximum permissible terms
serve as yardsticks even in a period of tightening credit, since the opportunity
to acquire loans on the marginal terms attracts lenders eager to maximize
yields.
Unfortunately, the effects of the direct local restraints on home building
by the field offices of FHA and V.A. cannot be assessed in the absence of
any record of these actions. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that this
method commends itself for several reasons. It can be applied locally where
needed and thus can take account of the great differences in local housing
market conditions. It can operate on those price or territorial or house-
The average annual income of FHA borrowers buying a new house in 1955 was
$5,969, and i1.2per cent of the borrowers had incomes of less than $4,000.9th
Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1955,Tables11-66 and 11-70.
For average debt service and monthly income of FHA borrowers, see Table 11-70 in
the same source.
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typesegments of area markets in which maladjustments exist or threaten,
leaving the others undisturbed. Because the interests affected are scattered,
adverse public reaction is minimized. The grounds for restraint in the issu-
ance of insurance or guaranty commitments are clearly related to the risks
to underwriting agencies that would result from local excess supplies of
housing relative to current demand. These observations do not imply that
nation-wide restrictions on maximum terms of government-underwritten
loans are unwarranted under any circumstances. They do emphasize the
need for more systematic exploration by FHA and V.A. of a method of
restraint that is even more selective and flexible than ordinary selective
credit controls applied across the board.
In the absence of systematic exploration and because coordination of FHA
and V.A. actions at the local level had to be improvised, the exercise of local
restraints in i seemsto have fallen short of the potentials ofthismethod.
If it is to be used more effectively in the future, five steps seem indicated:
(i)acareful study of experience; (2)improvementof data and techniques
usedin local housing market surveys and analyses; (3) comprehensive and
articulated criteria for initiation or removal of restraints by field offices so
TABLE 14
Outstanding Advancesofthe Federal Home Loan Banks, Monthly,1953-1958
(milliondollars)
Month 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Jan. 683.4 750.8 716.8 1,246.0 1,037.9 906.0
Feb. 626.7 677.0 688.4 1,181.3 976.0 789.8
March 610.7 629.7 701.8 1,138.1 960.7 696.3
April 626.2 613.4 754.3 1,126.8 971.3 814.8
May 644.2 608.4 821.4 1,123.0 992.9 802.8















Sept. 801.3 689.0 1,275.2 1,142.2 1,118.8 1,009.5
Oct. 818.7 707.7 1,344.2 1,148.2 1,131.4 1,083.1
Nov. 864.9 743.5, 1,364.4 1,153.5 1,143.2 1,122.5
Dec. 951.6 867.5 1,416.8 1,228.1 1,265.2 1,298.3
Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
as to minimize unequal and therefore inequitable performance; (4) adequate
supervision of field office actions by high-echelon headquarters personnel;
and standingprocedures for coordination if field offices of several gov-
ernment agencies are involved.
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Curbson interim Credit to Mortgage Lenders
The restraints on the use of interim credit by mortgage lenders followed
upon unusually sharp increases in borrowings from the Home Loan Banks
and in mortgage warehousing loans extended by commercial banks. Advances
outstanding of the Federal Home Loan Banks rose more than seasonally
from $688 million in February 1955to$i,o6i million in July, when the Bank
CHART4
Mortgage Warehousing Loans and Federal Home Loan Bank Advances Outstanding,
Selected Periods, 1954-1958
Millions of dollars
Board issued its general cautionary memorandum, and again to $1,275
millionin September when the Board formalized its restraints (Table i4).
The strong demand for funds by member institutions of the Federal Home
Loan Bank System was attributed to a large expansion of their forward com-
mitments to builders. Builders had turned increasingly to savings and loan
associations, the mortgage lending specialists, since other lenders, particularly
life insurance companies and savings banks which have a larger variety of
investment outlets and are therefore more responsive to changing demands
57
Aug. Aug. Nov. Feb. Moy Aug. Nov. Feb. May Aug. Feb.
19541955195519561956195619561957195719571958
Source: Tables 14 and IS.The Selective Credit Controls of 1955
inthe capital market, had reduced their residential mortgage commitments.
Mortgage warehousing loans by commercial banks had also increased rapidly
in late i954 and the first half ofi955, before the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York intervened. The amount of the increase, however, was unknown
until September when a special survey showed an expansion for weekly
reporting member banks of the Federal Reserve System from $6o8 million
in August 1954to$1.4 billion a year later (Table 15). Together, these two
types of credit rose between August 1954andAugust 1955by$1.3 billion,
or more than ioo per cent (Chart 4).
The restraints on mortgage warehousing loans and on borrowings from the
Home Loan Banks produced extreme reactions among trade groups. A lead-
ing spokesman for home builders was quoted to the effect that the action
against warehousing credit might promote a "severe crisis in home building."
Press reports gave the impression that the "Fed" wished to curb all forms
of warehousing credit and had threatened to withdraw the discount privilege
from errant banks.32 The curbs on borrowings from the Home Loan Banks
gave the impression that the doors of the banks had been shut, and those
savings and loan associations which for many years had relied on the banks
for advances permitting them to expand their mortgage investments felt they
had been abandoned.
The acute reaction was provoked by a number of circumstances. In the
case of warehousing loans, the failure to reveal the precise nature of the steps
taken by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the absence of any
dependable data on the volume of these loans before September contributed
to confusion and to irresponsible exaggeration of the severity of the restraint.
Until the president of the bank clarified the matter publicly by a letter to
Congressman Rains, dated September 12butpublished only in October,33
it was not even clear whether the action had emanated from the Board of
Governors in Washington or from one or several of the Federal Reserve
Banks. in the case of borrowings from the Home Loan Banks, a temporary
liquidity squeeze experienced during the summer and fall by members of the
Bank System was the result of poor planning by both the member institutions
and the banks themselves, lack of data (in this case on forward commitments
by members, a deficiency that has since been corrected), and the overly
cautious attitude of both the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Treasury
on the issuance of additional obligations. The liquidity problem was accen-
tuated by an unexpected ebb in the net flow of savings during the summer of
1955.FromJune to the end of the year, the banks had to float nine separate
issues of obligations for a total of $856 million, in addition to selling govern-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Selective Credit Controls of 1955
drawals of members' deposits. Inexperience with restraints in a credit reserve
system hitherto geared mainly to promotion and expansion and incomplete
mastery by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of the art of communication
compounded the difficulties.84
In any event, the restraints on interim credit had much more moderate
over-all effects than the violent reaction in the trade suggested, although their
impact on capital-deficit areas such as the West and Southwest was pro-
nounced. Federal' Home Loan Bank advances outstanding, which usually
expand in the latter part of the year, were allowed to increase to more than
$r.4billion at the end of 1955. In spite of their reduction in the early months
of the following year, which was partly seasonal, they remained at all-time
peaks through July 1956 (on a month-to-month comparison) and continued
at high levels 10 the end of 1957.Similarly,mortgage warehousing loans
outstanding kept on rising after the "cautionary talks" of July 1955,largely
because of previous commitments, and reached a peak of $i.6 billion in
November. The decline by $269 million between November and May
1956 was quite moderate and gave way to a renewed (perhaps seasonal)
increase between May and November i956.Thereafter, mortgage warehous-
ing loans dropped more sharply. Nevertheless, the volume of these loans,
combined with borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Banks throughout
1956 and 1957, remained at a higher level than before the upsurge of interim
credit in 1954-1955(Chart4).
More significant than the confusing circumstances surrounding the actions
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York are two fundamental issues. One is the relation between stability
in the mortgage and housing markets and changes in the volume of interim
credit. The other is a reconsideration of the functions of the Federal Home
Loan Bank System.
Since national resources were under strain in 1955, marked expansion of
any type of bank credit had, of course, inflationary potentials, and it would
be difficult to demonstrate that these were any greater for mortgage ware-
housing loans than for other bank loans. Disregarding the effects of the rapid
increase of mortgage warehousing on the financial system and the economy
as a whole, what if any were its specific unstabilizing consequences in the
housing and mortgage markets? The consequences can best be identified,
first, as the stimulation, during a period of strain on resources, of residential
construction and home purchase activity beyond the flow of savings chan-
neled into the housing sector and, second, as the depressing influences of
Cf. Mortgage Market Problems, pp. 44-57; the address of Walter W. McAllister,
Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, before the 63rd Annual Conven-
tion of the United States Savings and Loan League at Miami Beach, November 7,
1955;Reportof Special Committee to Study FHLB System; and Blueprint for the
Future, National Savings and Loan League, i957.
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subsequent Iiquithtion of interim loans when permanent investors would
reduce their current mortgage lending in order to absorb the mortgages
delivered from the "warehouse." As a general proposition, one may assume
that a given level of final mortgage lending under existing institutional ar-
rangements requires a certain amount of interim credit so as to synchronize
the complex processes of building and financing homes. If the relative fluc-
tuations of interim credit are no greater than those of final lending and if its
volume is moving in the same direction as the latter, this type of credit may
be said to have a neutral effect on stability in the mortgage and housing
markets. If interim credit fluctuates more sharply than final lending and
moves in the same direction, however, interim credit tends to have an un-
stabilizing effect. This was the case during the period 1954-1955.Between
the summer of 1954 and late 1955,mortgagewarehousing credit rose by
more than $ibillion,or 167 per cent, while the net flow of funds into resi-
dential mortgages increased by $19.6 billion, or 24percent.35 The relative
importance of mortgage warehousing loans in the expansion of funds avail-
able to builders and home purchasers appears in even sharper relief when
they are compared to gross lending activity. Assuming an average annual
turnover ratio of 2,Klamanestimates the gross volume of interim credit
extended during 1955at$3 billion, or i3per cent of the total amount of
mortgage loans made for the purchase of new or existing houses and equal
to 30percent of the amount of FHA and V.A. loans made during that
year. 36
In contrast, the effects of the subsequent liquidation of mortgage ware-
housing loans were quite moderate. If the minor and irregular movements
between November 1955andNovember 1956 are ignored, the volume of
such loans declined by a little over $500millionbetween November 1956
and February 1958. Other things being equal, this is the amount by which
permanent investors presumably reduced their current net lending on resi-
dential mortgages in order to absorb the loans delivered to them at the end
of the warehousing period. Since the net flow of funds• into residential
mortgages during the year 1957aloneis estimated at billion(Table 3),
the liquidation effect presumably was one of modest proportions.37
The restraints on borrowings from the Home Loan Banks served to raise
35The residential mortgage debt stood at $8x.i billion at the end of June and
at $100.7billionat the end of 1955. (Cf. Saul B. Kiaman, The Volume of Mortgage
Debt in the Postwar Decade, National Bureau of Economic Research, Technical
Paper 13, 1958,Tablei.) These dates come closest to those for which figures on
mortgage warehousing loans are available.
"Klainan, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Chapter 7.
This would be true even if the $927 million (net) of mortgages acquired by the
Federal National Mortgage Association in 1957 (Table 4) was deducted from the
total net flow.
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ahost of questions on the very purposes of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System. Is it the system's function to help promote stability in the mortgage
market and maintain general economic stability, or should it simply seek to
accommodate its members and leave the accomplishment of these larger
objectives entirely to the Federal Reserve System? Is it discriminatory for
the Home Loan Banks to restrain their members, while other types of mort-
gage lenders are not subjected to specific restrictions? How can their purpose
of providing a liquidity reserve be reconciled with their function of supplying
funds for expansion of their members' mortgage investment programs? And
what reforms are required to prevent a recurrence of the 1955liquidity
squeeze?
These points can only be touched upon in the context of this essay. Neither
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act nor the hearings preceding it provide a
clear-cut expression of Congressional intent as to the broad philosophy of the
Home Loan Bank System. It is noteworthy, however, that the majority report
of the House Banking and Currency Committee, in recommending the enact-
ment of the Federal Home Loan Bank Bill of 1932,anticipatedthat the
system would "regulate the supply of mortgage credit in a way that will
discourage building booms and support normal construction year in and year
out." 89 Moreover, the question was not whether the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board was exercising prerogatives of the Federal Reserve System, but
whether it should be allowed to work at cross-purposes with general mone-
tary policies. As for discrimination through restraint, access to a reserve
bank has always been considered a privilege rather than a right, and the
restrictions on borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Banks were only
one of several measures affecting all types of mortgage lenders.4°
In a study attempting to distill the lessons drawn from the 1955 experi-
ence, several measures were suggested to avoid a recurrence of the liquidity
difficulties encountered at that time. It was proposed that members of the
Bank System be required to obtain advance commitments for certain types
of borrowings from the Home Loan Banks, that long-term advances be made
from proceeds of the banks' long-term obligations and only to the extent that
such lending is consistent with national credit policy, that interest rates on
Cf. Report of the Special Committee to Study the Federal Home Loan Bank
System; A Program to Revitalize the Federal Home Loan Ban/c System, Savings Asso-
ciation League of New York, May 1958; McAllister, address cited in footnote 34;
and Gordon W. McKinley, "The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Control
of Credit," The Journal of Finance, September 1957. For an informative description
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, see The Federal Home Loan Bank System,
1952.
Report No. 1418,Houseof Representatives, 72d Congress, 1st Session, Creation
of not less than 8 and not more than 12FederalHome Loan Banks, p. io.
'°Fora contrary view on most of these points, cf. McKinley, op. ctt.
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long-term advances be used more effectively to influence the volume of
borrowing, and that the liquidity requirements for both member savings
and loan associations and the Federal Home Loan Banks themselves be
strengthened.41 The latter objective was accomplished in part by new liquid-
ity standards for the banks, which were established by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board in December 1955. The standards prescribed, among other
things, an increase in required liquidity reserves from 20 to 75 per cent of
members' deposits and a new liquidity reserve for unanticipated demands for
advances. Also, longer-term (five-year)obligations of the banks totaling
$290 million were issued in 1958toprovide funds for five-year advances to
members.42
Among other possibilities, serious consideration should be given to using
the interest rate on advances as a means of rationing this type of credit
before the blunt, cumbersome, and sometimes inequitable instrument of
quantitative restrictions is employed. The Board's regulation of September
1955, which seemed to prohibit new advances by the Home Loan Banks
except for emergencies resulting from large withdrawals of savings from
member institutions, not only had a pronounced shock effect but required
prompt revision to allow for a variety of unanticipated circumstances. A
modification in October permitted a member association to borrow if it used
half of its net inflow of savings and of loan repayments to meet previous
commitments. In December, members were allowed new borrowings up to
5 per cent of their savings accounts, provided their outstanding borrowings
did not exceed io per cent of these accounts.'3 Although this revision and
subsequent similar actions were designed as relaxations of the original rule,
they maintained the quantitative, across-the-board character of restrictions.
The Federal Home Loan Banks did raise the interest rates on their advances
by about .5 per cent between June and October i andfurther increases
followed. But the rates were increased at that time to keep them in line with
the higher cost of borrowed funds to the banks themselves rather than to
Report of Special Committee to Study FHLB System; Blueprint for the Future;
and Program to Revitalize FHLB System.
Letter of the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to the author,
dated June 25, 1958, and memorandum of the Office of Director, Division of FHLB
Operations, to the Home Loan Bank Presidents of December 9,1955, amendedin
memoranda dated June 14,1957, andFebruary 28, 1958. According to the letter,
the effectiveness of the increase in reserve requirements was demonstrated in 1957.
FromJune 13,.1957 toOctober 3, 1957,memberdeposits in the banks decreased by
$iig million and advances to members increasedby almost $154million,resulting in
a total fund requirement of nearly $273 million. To meet this demand it was necessary
to raise borrowings by the banks, in the form of consolidated obligations, by only $93.8
million.
Mortgage Market Problems, p. 53 (Exhibit C), and press release of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board of December z1955.
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discourageborrowing; the rate adjustments were slow and moderate; and
the chairman of the Bank Board expressed lack of faith in the restraining
effects of higher interest rates.44
General Appraisal
All in all, the foregoing review warrants the conclusion that the selective
regulations of housing credit made a moderate and short-lived contribution
to the restraint of home building and mortgage lending, together with other
forces operating in that direction, which were mainly the limitations of hous-
ing demand relative to supply in early 1955andthe tightening of financial
markets and restrictive general credit policies later. By the same token, the
selective measures can be credited with having had a moderate part in
correcting specific maladjustments in the housing and mortgage markets
inherited from the previous expansion of residential construction, that is, in
helping to avoid general overbuilding and an excessive spread of easy credit
terms for home purchase that might have threatened the stability of a large
component of the nation's private debt structure.45
That the selective credit measures of 1955 made a contribution to eco-
nomic stability over and above the results obtained from the general policy
of credit restraint is best illustrated by specific cases. As was shown, the
maximum permissible terms on government-underwritten loans had a "yard-
stick" effect on the terms which investors in such loans were willing to
accept. Without the restriction of these terms, some lenders, even during the
period when less funds were available, would probably have continued
making a larger volume of no-down-payment or low-down-payment and
long-maturity mortgages than they actually did; and they might have been
prepared to reduce their liquidity position further than they actually
did in order to accomplish this objective.
In the case of mortgage warehousing transactions, the relatively large
profits which attracted commercial banks into this type of lending would
probably have caused an even greater and more prolonged expansion if the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York had not intervened. Some of the banks
engaged in mortgage warehousing had perhaps reached a saturation point in
the summer of Butother banks were just becoming alert to the
"Ibid., p. 57. The Chairman of the Home Loan Bank Board, in discussing this
matter, characterized a .5 per cent increase in the interest rate as "very, very high."
Interest rates on advances ranged from 2.25 to 3.5 per Cent in June 1955 and from
2.5 to 4 per cent in October (data furnished by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.)
Theevidence of more balanced market conditions developing in latei and
thereafter will be discussed in the next chapter.
A representative of the Chase Manhattan Bank testified in October 1955 that his
institution had "shut down" its mortgage warehousing business because "we reached
the volume of mortgage credits that we felt we could properly and judiciously carry
until we had some run offs." (Investigation of Housing, p. io8.)
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opportunities for profit from multiple fees as well as from the interest charges
on warehousing loans and the various kinds of commitments associated with
them; 41thedemand by builders and mortgage companies for warehousing
credit was pressing; and banks may have been more willing to exchange
cash for the highly profitable and often self-liquidating mortgage warehous-
ing loans than for other types of credit.
As for borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Banks, their increase
would probably have been greater had it not been for restraining action by
the Bank Board, although the form of restraint exercised in the fall of 1955
is subject to question. The savings and loan association is a case par excel-
lence of "compartmentalization" in the capital market. This type of institu-
tion, being a mortgage lending specialist and having in most instances no
established access to credit other than that available from the Home Loan
Banks, is much less susceptible to yield differentials on alternative invest-
ments, shifting demands in the capital market, and Federal Reserve policies
than are other types of lenders. General credit restraint affects the ability of
savings and loan associations to borrow only indirectly and to the extent that
it influences the capacity of the Home Loan Banks themselves to float obliga-
tions, while the cash and short-term security holdings of the banks serve as
buffers against any marked impact of such restraint. Thus, restrictions on
borrowings from the banks can be expected to have effects over and above
those attributable to general Federal Reserve policies.48
It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that the selective measures of 1955
helped to reinforce the general policy of restraint, in addition to moderating
imbalances in the housing and mortgage markets. To be sure, there were
side effects, which weakened the "bite" of the selective regulations. In spite
of the restrictions on borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Banks, which
affected mainly conventional mortgage lending, and in the face of the
general monetary restraints, activity in the conventional mortgage market
was about the same in 1956 as in 1955,andthe entire drop in total mortgage
lending occurred in the government-underwritten sector (Table 2). Simi-
larly, the number of new dwelling units started with conventional loans
declined only fractionally between 1955and1956,whilestarts under the
For the connections between mortgage warehousing transactions and mortgage
lending commitments, cf. Guttentag, op. cit.; Kaplan, op. cit.; and Kiaman, The
Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Chapter 7.
The view that selective controls result merely in shifts in the supply of funds to
various sectors of the economy without affecting the aggregate supply fails to take
proper account of institutional factors in the mortgage and general capital markets
exemplified by these illustrations. For a recent exposition of this view, see Milton
Friedman, "Consumer Credit Control as an Instrument of Stabilization Policy," in
Consumer Instalment Credit (Part II, Vol. 2,Boardof Governors, Federal Reserve
System, 1957,p.85). An opposite view is expressed by Guttentag (op. cit.).
65The Selective Credit Controls of 1955
governmentprograms fell sharply (Table i). The forces producing these
differential movements will be examined later in detail. At this point, it is
worth noting that the general credit restraints failed to reduce appreciably
conventional mortgage lending. In contrast, the volume of government-
underwritten mortgages turned down sharply as they were subjected to
selective regulations, although their decline was reinforced during the course
of z 956 by the noncompetitive interest rates on these mortgages.
Another side effect, but one that did not impair the effectiveness of the
selective restraints on FHA and V.A. loans, was a change in the price mix
of new homes. According to sample surveys, the median proposed selling
price of new homes increased from $12,300 in 1954 to $13,700 in 1955 and
to $14,600 in 1956. This increase exceeded the rise in construction costs and
reflected in part the building of houses with more floor area and of better
quality.49 Also, land prices had advanced more than construction costs. But
a contributing factor in the changing price mix was the dimmed prospect for
successful marketing of lower-priced houses, for the sale of such houses
depends largely on the availability of low-down-payment and long-maturity
FHA and V.A. mortgage loans, which was reduced, among other things, by
the selective regulations.
Finally, there remains the question of the effects of these regulations on
the use of national resources. To the (moderate) extent that the selective
controls contributed to the decline in residential construction expenditures
after mid-1955, it may be said that they tended to restrain the sharply
increasing pressures on over-all resources. Alternatively, they may have
served to free resources for other uses, especially for nonresidential private
and public construction which draws in part on types of materials and labor
also employed for residential building and which was expanding rapidly in
the latter part of 1955 and in 1956. Quite apart from the matter of social
priorities, it has been suggested that this side effect, under the conditions of
that period, may have been undesirable for economic reasons because it had
an inflationary rather than restraining influence. It has been maintained, for
example, that "what was termed deflationary action—holding down mort-
gage funds—may have freed money for really inflationary effects."50 The
alleged reasons are mainly that:(i) a reduction of new building forces
more families to turn to existing homes and bid up their prices; (2) most
housing costs are little affected by moderate increases in the volume of home
building; and (3) the price of equipment for the expanding business invest-
'KathrynR. Murphy, "Characteristics of New i-Family Houses, 1954-56," Con-
struction Review, April 1957.
50RobinsonNewcomb, "Federal Expenditures for Housing and Urban Redevelop-
ment," Federal Expenditure Policy forEconomic Growthand Stability, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee Print, 85th Congress, 1st Session, November 5, 1957, p. 849.
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ment"might not have risen as much and the price of homes might have
risen if funds had been channeled into residential construction instead
of business investment goods.
Apart from the fact that these are presented as possible rather than neces-
sary or proven or even likely consequences, the reasoning seems strained.
For one thing, both general and selective credit restraints applied to pur-
chases of existing as well as new homes. Second, there is no evidence that
existing homes represented an unusually large proportion of the total sales
of homes in 1956,whenthe irestraints on housing credit were becoming
effective.5' Third, whatever limited price information there is available shows
that prices of existing homes increased less than those of new ones, giving
no support to the assertion that bidding for older property intensified relative
to the supply. The average purchase price of new homes bought with V.A.
loans increased by 4.6 per cent between and and by 7.3 per cent
between 1955 and 1956, as against increases for existing homes of 3.2 and
5.4 per cent, respectively. The average FHA estimated value of new homes
bought with FNA loans rose by io.o per cent between 1954 and 1955 and
by 12.4 per cent between 1955 and 1956, while the value of existing homes
in 1955 was the same as in 1954 and the increase from 1955 to 1956 was
only 6. r per cent.52 Fourth, building materials prices and construction costs
were, in fact, quite sensitive to the increase in home building in 1954-1955,
as they were in previous periods of residential construction booms, partly
because the price of lumber, an important component in home building, is
highly responsive to changes in demand. Between January i954 and July
1955, wholesale building materials prices advanced by 5.1 per cent (Table
12) and lumber prices alone by 8 per cent, while residential construction
costs rose by 3.5 per cent (Table 7). These increases occurred in a period
when the upsurge in residential building accounted for most of the expansion
in total new construction. Land costs advanced even more Because
of changes in efficiency or builders' profit margins, these cost movements do
not necessarily represent the movement in final prices to home purchasers.
Nevertheless, they indicate severe pressures on resources which the limited
51Cf."Residential Real Estate Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1957.
For V.A. data, cf. "Financial Characteristics of G.I. Home Loans Closed in i 956,"
Construction Review, November 1957. For FHA data, ioth Annual Report, Housing
and Home Finance Agency, 1956, Table 111-38. The value changes were associated
in part with changes in the physical characteristics of homes bought during this
period. Thus, in the case of new homes bought with FHA loans, the median "calcu-
lated" area increased from 961 square feet in 1954 to 1,064 square feet in 1956, and
the median number of rooms rose from 5.4 to 5.7. In the case of existing homes, these
characteristics remained more stable(ibid.). Nevertheless,if bidding for existing
homes had substantially intensified relative to supply, one would expect to find a more
pronounced increase in their values than the available data indicate.
Cf. footnote 4.
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short-termimprovements in average efficiency or reductions in profit margins
could not be expected to offset.54
For an evaluation of the effects of credit policies on the allocation of resources
to housing and other sectors, see also Warren L. Smith, "The Impact of Monetary
Policy on Residential Construction,i 948-58," Study of Mortgage Credit.
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